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Emergency department patient safety incident
characterization: an observational analysis of the
findings of a standardized peer review process
Zach K Jepson, Chad E Darling, Kevin A Kotkowski, Steven B Bird, Michael W Arce, Gregory A Volturo
and Martin A Reznek*
Abstract
Background: Emergency Department (ED) care has been reported to be prone to patient safety incidents (PSIs).
Improving our understanding of PSIs is essential to prevent them. A standardized, peer review process was
implemented to identify and analyze ED PSIs. The primary objective of this investigation was to characterize ED
PSIs identified by the peer review process. A secondary objective was to characterize PSIs that led to patient harm.
In addition, we sought to provide a detailed description of the peer review process for others to consider as they
conduct their own quality improvement initiatives.
Methods: An observational study was conducted in a large, urban, tertiary-care ED. Over a two-year period, all ED
incident reports were investigated via a standardized, peer review process. PSIs were identified and analyzed for
contributing factors including systems failures and practitioner-based errors. The classification system for factors
contributing to PSIs was developed based on systems previously reported in the emergency medicine literature as
well as the investigators’ experience in quality improvement and peer review. All cases in which a PSI was discovered
were further adjudicated to determine if patient harm resulted.
Results: In 24 months, 469 cases were investigated, identifying 152 PSIs. In total, 188 systems failures and 96
practitioner-based errors were found to have contributed to the PSIs. In twelve cases, patient harm was determined
to have resulted from PSIs. Systems failures were identified in eleven of the twelve cases in which a PSI resulted in
patient harm.
Conclusion: Systems failures were almost twice as likely as practitioner-based errors to contribute to PSIs, and
systems failures were present in the majority of cases resulting in patient harm. To effectively reduce PSIs, ED
quality improvement initiatives should focus on systems failure reduction.
Keywords: Patient safety incidents, Peer review, Emergency department
Background
It has been stated that “medicine used to be simple, inef-
fective, and relatively safe; now it is complex, effective,
and dangerous” [1], confronting us with the notion that
modern health care delivery is error prone. As early as
the turn of the previous century, patient safety pioneers
began to understand this [2,3], but it was not until the
publication of the landmark Institute of Medicine
(IOM) report, “To Err is Human” [4], in 1999 that
healthcare communities in general began to understand
the magnitude and gravity of “errors” in healthcare.
Since the IOM report, organizations such as the World
Health Organization have recommended using the term
‘patient safety incident’ (PSI) as opposed to ‘medical error’
[5], but the principles remain unchanged. A PSI has been
defined as any unintended or unexpected incident that
could have or did lead to the harm of a patient [5].
“To Err is Human” demonstrated that our current
health care system is flawed and often puts our patients
at risk of harm. This may hold particularly true for care
in the Emergency Department (ED) which has been
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identified as a patient care setting that is prone to PSIs for
a variety of reasons including a chaotic work environment,
high patient acuity, multiple transitions in care, and ED
crowding [6-8]. Some reports have suggested that PSIs in
emergency medicine (EM) occur in diagnosis, pharmaco-
therapy, procedures, and communication [8-12], and that
many ED PSIs may be preventable [12]. Despite the clear
importance of this area of research, studies describing
ED PSIs remain limited in number and vary greatly in
their scope and methodology [10-13]. Consequently our
understanding of PSIs in EM remains incomplete to date,
and further studies are needed to better characterize PSIs
that occur in the ED setting as well as circumstances in
which they ultimately result in patient harm. Peer review
has been cited as one potentially valuable source for PSI
identification and analysis [13,14].
The primary objective of this investigation was to
identify, analyze and characterize ED PSIs via a standard-
ized, peer review process. Secondary objectives included:
1) the analysis and characterization of circumstances in
which PSIs led to patient harm and 2) to describe in detail
the standardized, peer review process itself so that others
may use it as a template for similar quality and safety
improvement processes in their institutions.
Methods
Study design, setting, and population
This was an observational study conducted at a tertiary
care, adult, urban ED with a university affiliation and an
approximate annual census of 66,000 patients from
October 2010 through September 2012. The site is an
American College of Surgeons-verified Level I trauma
center and also serves as a regional stroke and ST-
elevation myocardial infarction referral center. The ED
is the primary teaching site for an accredited 3-year EM
residency. Board certified EM physicians care directly
for the majority of patients either as the sole provider or
through direct supervision of EM and rotating residents.
Approximately 5% of patients are seen primarily by mid-
level practitioners; an attending EM physician may or
may not be directly involved in the care of those patients
but is directly available for supervision as needed. The
data collection and study methods were reviewed and
approved by the University of Massachusetts Medical
School Institutional Review Board.
Methods and measurements
In order to improve the identification and analysis of
potential PSIs in the ED, a highly structured peer-review
process was implemented in 2010 (Figure 1). The format
of the peer-review process was based on one previously
described at Detroit Receiving Hospital (DRH) [13].
All ED incident reports were analyzed via the peer
review process. Incident reports were submitted via a
standardized, electronic, hospital incident reporting process
or as direct verbal, written or electronic communications
to ED leadership. Incident reports originated from both
clinical and non-clinical individuals and groups including
but not limited to: patients, patients’ families, ED providers
(nurses, residents, attending physicians), inpatient providers
and consultants, hospital quality and clinical care commit-
tees, and providers from outside the hospital. In order to
promote reporting from hospital-based sources, practi-
tioners and committees were informed and reminded
about the ED peer-review system on an ongoing basis.
Every incident report submitted to the attention of ED
leadership was analyzed via the peer review process as a
matter of policy. For practical considerations, each incident
report first underwent a preliminary screening review
by the ED Clinical Director/Vice-Chairman of Clinical
Operations to determine if there was any potential for a
PSI having occurred. If it could be determined with
“absolute certainty” that no PSI had occurred, the case
was excluded from further review. (For example, the
perceptions of the incident reporter were determined to
be factually inaccurate.) Otherwise, the default would be
for the case to progress to a full Peer Review Committee
(PRC) evaluation. The PRC was open to all physicians,
residents and mid-level practitioners in the ED. A core
group of eight board-certified emergency physicians
attended the monthly PRC meetings regularly to ensure
accuracy and consistency in the review process.
Prior to the PRC evaluation of an incident report
under review, all ED practitioners involved in the case
received a peer review response packet which included a
copy of the relevant portions of the patient’s medical
record and a peer review response document with
prompting questions related to the quality concerns in the
case. The prompting questions were specifically tailored
to each case, but in general each had a broad prompting
question or statement such as “please comment on the
care provided” or “did you perceive any opportunities
for improvement in the care?” Other more specific
questions were included as necessary to ensure response
to a specific area of concern suspected by the reporter or
preliminary reviewer, for example, “did you perceive a
delay in diagnosis, and if so could you please comment
on potential contributing factors?” Each practitioner was
required to return the peer review response document
after commenting in writing about the care that was
provided and any other circumstances related to the
specific quality or safety issues in question. This allowed
for information pertinent to the case that might not be
available in the medical record to be presented to the
PRC committee during the case review. The provider(s)
involved in the case were also encouraged, but not
required, to attend the PRC meeting. At the PRC meeting,
all committee members reviewed the medical records and
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the practitioners’ written feedback. The medical records
(and the practitioners’ written feedback if they did not
attend the PRC review) were de-identified.
Following review of the medical records and response
documents, each case underwent a period of facilitated
discussion related to potential PSIs. Specifically, the
committee reviewed each case for six types of systems
failures and five types of practitioner-based errors (Table 1).
The classification system utilized in the peer review process
was developed based on systems previously reported in the
emergency medicine literature as well as the investigators’
experience in quality improvement and peer review. The
practitioner-based error classification was modeled after a
system reported by Berk et al. [13]. For systems failures,
the classification approach was based on portions of a
framework suggested by Cosby [15]. Generally, there
was group consensus when systems failures were iden-
tified; however, if there was any dispute, a majority vote
determined whether systems failures had occurred. For
practitioner-based error identification, a majority vote
determined whether one had occurred. Average committee
attendance was ten per meeting of which board-certified
and board-eligible attending physicians accounted for 86%.
All committee participants were eligible to vote in general,
however providers involved in a case in question were
required to leave the room for the vote on practitioner-
based error in that specific case in order to reduce
influence on the committee determination.
Finally, the PRC analyzed each case in which one or
more systems failures or practitioner-based errors were
identified to determine if the PSI resulted in patient
harm. Harm was classified as temporary, permanent or
death. If it could not be determined definitively that the
PSI directly caused or contributed to patient injury or
death, patient harm was classified to be “no harm or
unknown”.
The entire peer review process, including the cataloging
of cases and the practitioner response documents, was
executed in a fashion that complied with state legal
statutes related to peer review protection. For informa-
tion to be protected from legal discovery, the following
requirements were followed: all written and electronic
documents were titled “confidential: peer review”, all
documents were stored in locked files and/or password
protected databases and verbal discussion were not
allowed outside of specifically designated peer review
meetings. As a final protective measure, if any written
or electronic communication was required related to
the peer review findings, the communication did not
contain any patient or provider identifiers.
Data collection and analysis
The primary outcomes reported in this study were the
types and frequencies of systems failures and practitioner-
based errors contributing to PSIs identified by the peer
review process over a 24-month data collection period.
PSIs and contributing factors identified by the peer
review process were cataloged prospectively in a quality
assurance database. This database was reviewed and
descriptive statistics were calculated. In addition, retro-
spective chart review of each case in which a PSI was
identified was performed to determine patient age, sex,
and primary ED diagnosis. Primary ED diagnoses were
classified into twenty systems/disease-based diagnostic
categories: cardiovascular, dental, dermatologic, endo-
crine, gastrointestinal, hematologic, infectious disease,
musculoskeletal (non-trauma), neurologic, obstetrical/
gynecologic, oncologic, ophthalmologic, otolaryngolo-
gic, psychiatric, pulmonary, renal, toxicologic, trauma,
urologic, and unknown.
The secondary outcomes reported in this study were the
types and frequencies of systems failures and practitioner-
Incident report 
received by ED 
leadership
Initial Screening 
Review
PSI excluded with certainty
PSI not excluded with 
certainty
ED practitioners involved in the care 
comment in writing about the care that 
was provided
Peer Review Committee Review: 
Facilitated review for PSI, and if PSI 
found, systems and practitioner-based
contributing factors
No PSI identified
PSI and contributing factors
identified, cataloged and used for 
quality improvement processes
Case closed
Figure 1 Flow diagram of the peer review process.
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based errors that occurred in cases in which the peer
review process determined that patient harm defini-
tively resulted from a PSI. Incidents of patient harm
resulting from PSIs were cataloged prospectively in the
peer review database. The database was reviewed and
descriptive statistics were calculated.
Results
Over a period of 24 months, 469 incident reports were
analyzed via the peer review process. Of the 469 cases,
188 (40%) met criteria for further analysis by the PRC
and 281 (60%) were found to have no PSIs during the
initial screening process. Of the 188 cases reviewed by
the PRC, 152 were found to have one or more systems
failures or practitioner-based errors. In total, 188 systems
failures and 96 practitioner-based errors were identified
in the 152 cases. The most common systems failures in-
volved teamwork, and the most common practitioner-
based errors were classified as cognitive errors (Table 2).
The mean and median age of the patients in whose care
a PSI was identified were 53.7 and 56 years, respectively,
and 49.0% were female. The most frequent diagnostic
categories for cases in which a PSI was identified were:
infectious disease (15.8%), neurologic (13.2%), cardiovascu-
lar (12.5%), gastrointestinal (11.2%), trauma-related (10.5%),
non-trauma related musculoskeletal (7.9%) and urologic
(5.3%). The remaining diagnostic categories each included
less than 4.0% of the cases in which a PSI was identified.
In 140 of the 152 cases (92%) in which PSIs occurred,
the PRC determined that no or unknown harm resulted
from the PSIs. In twelve cases (8%), the PRC determined
that patient harm definitively resulted (Table 3). Of these
twelve cases, eleven (92%) involved one or more systems
failures, and nine (75%) involved a practitioner-based
error. Eight of the nine cases of harm with a practitioner-
based error (89%) had a concomitant systems failure, and
only in one case of the twelve (8%) did a practitioner-
based error alone lead to patient harm. In ten of the
twelve cases (83%) of PSIs resulting in patient harm, mul-
tiple failures/errors were determined to have occurred,
and multiple failures/errors were determined to have oc-
curred in all three of the most serious cases of resultant
harm (permanent harm or death). ED teamwork failures
and major cognitive errors occurred in each of the cases
of permanent harm or death, and in two of these cases,
hospital teamwork failures also occurred.
Table 1 Classification criteria for systems failures and practitioner-based errors identified by the PRC
Type of PSI Definition Example
Systems failures
Triage A failure in assessment of potential disease severity during triage Abnormal vital signs not recognized as a potential
sign of shock
ED teamwork A failure due to an issue with ED staff communication or a shared
responsibility across multiple ED staff
Change in vital signs not communicated to the
attending physician
Hospital Teamwork A failure due to an issue with communication between ED and hospital
staff or a shared responsibility between the ED and hospital staff
Pertinent information not communicated to the
admitting team
ED work environment A failure resulting from the lack, malfunction, or mal-design of resources,
equipment, or physical space within the ED or a failure due to not
following an ED policy or clinical practice guideline
Missing equipment
Hospital work
environment
A failure resulting from the lack, malfunction, or mal-design of resources,
equipment, or physical plant outside the ED but still within the hospital or
a failure due to not following a hospital policy or clinical practice guideline
Specialty testing areas remotely located from
the ED
Boarded patient A failure occurring after a patient is admitted to an in-patient service
but is still physically located in the ED
N/A
Practitioner-based errors
Major cognitive error An error which represents serious mismanagement in a knowledge
area basic to EM
Failure to diagnose or treat ST-elevation myocardial
infarction
Cognitive error An error which represents mismanagement which is either less
serious than a major cognitive error or in an area less basic to EM
Failure to consider the institutional antibiogram
during antibiotic selection for treatment of simple
urinary tract infection
Missed radiographic
finding
An error in interpretation of a radiographic study that did not
reach the level of a cognitive or major cognitive error
Missed fracture on radiographic interpretation that
was splinted correctly based on clinical suspicion
Policy deviation An error in following a clinical or administrative policy, guideline or
standard practice that does not reach the level of cognitive or major
cognitive error
Failure to alert the transplant service when a
transplant patient is in the ED
Procedural error A technical error during performance of a procedure that does
not reach the level of a cognitive or major cognitive error
Insufficient sterile technique
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Discussion
The results of this investigation demonstrate that PSIs
occur frequently in the ED. Contributing to the identi-
fied PSIs, systems failures were almost twice as common
as practitioner-based errors. Furthermore, systems fail-
ures occurred in over 90% of the cases in which patient
harm was determined to have resulted from the PSI.
Only in one case did harm result from a practitioner-
based error in isolation. These findings suggest that
systems failures within the ED work environment con-
tribute more significantly to PSIs and patient harm.
To date, investigations of PSIs in the ED setting have
been fairly limited in number despite the importance
and urgency of improving our understanding of PSIs.
Contributing to this relative lack of data is the fact that
no clear consensus on optimal methodologies in this area
of research exists. Of the few studies that do exist in EM
including this one, all have highly disparate methodologies
[8,9,11-13]. Because of their varied study designs, the ED
PSI investigations have unique potential advantage
and disadvantage profiles. For example, the National
Emergency Department Safety Study was a large multi-
center study that identified PSIs by structured chart
review but only focused on a limited number of medical
conditions: myocardial infarction, asthma exacerbation,
and joint dislocation involving procedural sedation [8,12].
Another study by Fordyce et al. prospectively detected
PSIs through intense direct observation of ED providers
and staff, however, the study was limited to a period of
one week [11]. Smith et al. attempted to identify PSIs in a
focused area, transitions of care in the ED, by querying ED
residents about their perceptions of error [9]. Finally,
the only peer review-based investigation other than the
present study, Berk et al., focused on practitioner-based
errors and did not report on systems failures [13].
In contrast to the aforementioned studies, the unique
strengths of the present study design included a struc-
tured, non-punitive peer review process that incorporated
feedback from the practitioner(s) involved in the care in
question, allowing for first-person accounts of the case
under review. Additionally, case reviews were performed
by a committee that included multiple practicing, board
certified, EM physicians which we believe strengthened
the committee’s ability to determine the presence or ab-
sence of PSIs. Lastly, the present study examined potential
PSIs occurring over an extended two-year time frame and
was not limited by diagnosis-based inclusion criteria.
Given this unique design advantage profile (as well as
some potential limitations discussed below), the present
investigation complements the existing, limited body of
original investigations of ED PSIs. Our results are con-
sistent with those prior studies that have implicated
work systems as being intimately involved in ED PSIs.
For instance, other investigators have stated that ED
Table 2 Systems failures and practitioner-based errors identified by the peer review process
Systems failures (n = 188) N (%) Practitioner-based errors (n = 96) N (%)
ED teamwork failures 79 (42) Cognitive errors 65 (68)
Hospital teamwork failures 59 (31) Major cognitive errors 24 (25)
Boarded patients 26 (14) Missed radiographic findings 4 (4)
ED work environment failures 14 (7) Policy deviations 3 (3)
Hospital work environment failures 6 (3) Procedural errors 0 (0)
Triage failures 4 (2)
Table 3 Systems failures and practitioner-based errors identified in cases of patient harm
Case Patient harm System failures and practitioner-based errors contributing to harm
1 Death ED teamwork, major cognitive error
2 Death ED teamwork, hospital teamwork, boarded patient, major cognitive error
3 Permanent harm ED teamwork, hospital teamwork, major cognitive error
4 Temporary harm ED teamwork, cognitive error
5 Temporary harm ED teamwork, hospital teamwork, cognitive error
6 Temporary harm ED work environment, cognitive error
7 Temporary harm Cognitive error
8 Temporary harm ED teamwork, hospital teamwork, major cognitive error
9 Temporary harm ED teamwork, boarded patient
10 Temporary harm ED teamwork, hospital teamwork, major cognitive error
11 Temporary harm ED teamwork, Hospital work environment
12 Temporary harm Hospital teamwork
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systems must be changed in order to lower the incidence
of errors [11], and Camargo et al. recently concluded
that systems factors such as staffing, teamwork, and
safety culture are important mediators of error in the
ED [12]. In aggregate, ED PSI studies, including the
present investigation, provide a significant, growing body
of evidence supporting those who have argued that
heightened focus should be placed on the work environ-
ment and other factors that contribute to error rather
than on the error itself [14,16,17].
A unique finding of the present study design that
warrants further discussion is the fact that nearly 60%
of the incident reports were found to have no potential
for a PSI on initial screening. Anecdotally, a few of
these reports were submitted by healthcare providers
that were not aware of all of the facts of a case at the
time that they submitted their incident report, but the
majority of the reports that did not progress past the
initial screening involved complaints submitted by patients
and families. Data from previous investigations have
suggested that patient and family concerns often are
related to incomplete or delayed relief in symptoms,
suboptimal practitioner communication, or billing related
to their medical services [6,18,19]. Our anecdotal experi-
ence matched these previous reports. While such feedback
was still highly valued for its potential to improve the
overall patient experience (and was acted upon via other
mechanisms within the department), it did not meet
criteria to progress to peer review committee analysis
because a safety incident had not occurred.
Limitations
The present study has several design strengths including
the highly structured peer review process and the
extended study time-period, however, it also has potential
limitations that must be considered when interpreting the
results. First, any peer review process necessarily requires
human interpretation and as such may be prone to bias
[17,20,21]. Several measures were designed into the peer
review process to reduce the potential for bias, but it was
unlikely that all bias was eliminated. A second potential
limitation was the fact that the preliminary screening was
performed by a single reviewer. While not ideal, this
format was necessary due to practical considerations. To
minimize potential accuracy or bias limitations inherent in
single-reviewer screening, the chosen preliminary reviewer
had greater than ten years of professional experience in
peer review as well as health-care quality management in
general. In addition, the preliminary review process was
designed to be more inclusive to minimize the potential
for missing any true PSIs. It is not possible to determine
definitively if this approach was effective in this regard,
however the finding that 36 cases (19.1%) that did meet
initial screening criteria subsequently were found not to
have PSIs on full review suggests that the approach was at
least in part effective. A third potential limitation of the
present study was that the review process only identified
harm having occurred if a causal relationship between a
PSI and patient harm was definitive. This likely increased
the false negative rate for harm causality.
A final potential criticism of the present study design
could be that it may have missed a significant number of
PSIs because under-capture of PSIs is known to occur with
passive incident reporting systems in inpatient settings
[22-24]. Theoretically, this phenomenon likely also exists
in the ED setting, but the extent to which it occurs in the
ED has yet to be studied objectively. Some have suggested
automatic reviews of 72-hour ED returns, deaths within a
certain time frame of admission from the ED, and ED
deaths as additional potential sources for improved PSI
capture in the ED [13,25]. However, the effectiveness of
these methods have not been studied, so the extent to
which the results may have been affected by not including
them in the study methodology is unclear. Of note, ED
deaths were automatically reviewed via a separate process
within the institution. Over the two-year period of this
study, this separate ED death review process found only
two cases having concerns for PSIs, and both in fact
were captured independently by the peer review process
described in this investigation. This may provide some
support toward automatic ED death reviews not being
of additional benefit. Also of note, the capture rate of
practitioner-based errors in the present study were
similar to those reported in a prior study that did include
automatic review of 72-hour ED returns resulting in
admission, deaths in the ED, and deaths within 24 hours
of admission from the ED (systems failures were not
reported in that study so it was not possible to compare
the system failure capture rates) [13]. It therefore also
remains unclear if adding automatic reviews of 72-hour
returns or deaths within 24 hours of admission would
have increased the observed PSI capture rate in this
study. We are aware of no specific data to support the
following hypothesis, but it may be possible that the
phenomenon of under-reporting of incidents may not
be as pronounced in the ED as other healthcare settings.
Nearly all patient care occurring in the ED results in a
hand-off to an inpatient or outpatient team. Those teams
may be more likely to report incidents both because PSIs
may become more apparent with the passage of time and
because there may be fewer perceived disincentives to
reporting if the reporter or their departmental colleagues
were not primarily responsible for the care in question.
While it is not possible to determine the extent of under-
reporting of incidents that occurred during this study, for
the reasons outlined above, we believe that the effect may
not have been as significant as some may theorize. In
addition, while under-reporting may have resulted in the
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total number of identified PSIs being low, we have no
reason to suspect that the phenomenon would bias the
proportion of systems failures versus practitioner based-
errors, although we acknowledge that it remains possible.
Conclusions
The results of this investigation reveal that systems fail-
ures lead to PSIs and patient harm more frequently than
practitioner-based errors in the ED. These findings sug-
gest that to effectively reduce PSIs and patient harm,
systems failure prevention should be a priority within
ED quality programs.
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